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Abstract—Strategic level analysis of the integrated 
behavior of lunar transportation and lunar surface systems 
architecture options is performed to assess the benefit, 
viability, affordability, and robustness of system design 
choices. This analysis employs both deterministic and 
probabilistic modeling techniques so that the extent of 
potential future uncertainties associated with each option 
are properly characterized. The results of these analyses 
are summarized in a predefined set of high-level Figures 
of Merit (FOMs) so as to provide senior NASA 
Constellation Program (CxP) and Exploration Systems 
Mission Directorate (ESMD) management with pertinent 
information to better inform strategic level decision 
making. 1,2 
The strategic level exploration architecture model is 
designed to perform analysis at as high a level as possible 
but still capture those details that have major impacts on 
system performance. The strategic analysis methodology 
focuses on integrated performance, affordability, and risk 
analysis, and captures the linkages and feedbacks 
between these three areas. Each of these results leads into 
the determination of the high-level FOMs. This strategic 
level analysis methodology has been previously applied 
to Space Shuttle and International Space Station 
assessments and is now being applied to the development 
of the Constellation Program point-of-departure lunar 
architecture. This paper provides an overview of the 
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strategic analysis methodology and the lunar exploration 
architecture analyses to date. In studying these analysis 
results, the strategic analysis team has identified and 
characterized key drivers affecting the integrated 
architecture behavior. These key drivers include inclusion 
of a cargo lander, mission rate, mission location, fixed-
versus-variable costs/return on investment, and the 
requirement for probabilistic analysis. Results of 
sensitivity analysis performed on lunar exploration 
architecture scenarios are also presented. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As NASA and partner agencies, both U.S. and 
international, move forward with the planning for human 
lunar return, strategic analysis will play a key role in 
helping to select architectures and scenarios that will 
result in productive, reliable, and affordable lunar 
exploration systems. Strategic analysis serves to inform 
decision makers of the benefit, viability, affordability, and 
robustness of system design options by providing 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20090012433 2019-08-30T06:32:46+00:00Z
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integrated analysis of system performance over the full 
system life cycle, from the cradle to beyond the grave. 
Over the past three years, NASA’s Constellation Program 
(CxP) senior management has applied this strategic 
analysis methodology to inform the design of lunar 
transportation and surface architectures, seeking 
refinement of the NASA Space Exploration Program 
through ongoing analysis to meet the needs, goals, and 
objectives defined by NASA’s Exploration Systems 
Mission Directorate in support of the implementation of 
the Vision for Space Exploration outlined by the 
President in 2004. Through the application of strategic 
analysis by the CxP Strategic Analysis Team (SAT) over 
the last three years, certain key drivers have become 
apparent. These key drivers contribute directly to the 
performance, cost, risk, and value of lunar exploration 
architecture scenarios. In addition, sensitivity analysis is 
performed on these scenarios to inform the designers of 
the influence of design choices on the scenarios. 
This paper provides an overview of the strategic analysis 
methodology applied by the CxP SAT. Lunar exploration 
architectures are briefly described with a focus on 
overarching assumptions. The key drivers that have been 
determined to date are discussed, along with how these 
key drivers affect performance, cost, risk, and value of 
the architectures. In addition, sensitivity analysis results 
are discussed. 
2. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OVERVIEW  
In order to achieve NASA’s goal of returning to the lunar 
surface to allow for an extended, permanent human 
presence, an initial transportation architecture design was 
developed during the Exploration Systems Analysis Study 
(ESAS). [1] After the completion of ESAS, a need still 
existed for high-level study of the integrated system 
behavior. The CxP Strategic Analysis Team (SAT) was 
created in response to this need.  The SAT supports the 
development of human lunar architectures through 
integrated analysis of the performance, cost, risk, and the 
value of the lunar transportation and surface systems. The 
strategic analysis methodology employed by the SAT 
allows NASA senior-level decision makers to understand 
the benefit, viability, affordability, and robustness 
impacts of various system design options. This strategic 
level analysis methodology has been previously applied 
to Space Shuttle and International Space Station 
assessments. 
Strategic analysis focuses on integrating performance, 
affordability, and risk analysis, and capturing the linkages 
and feedbacks between these three areas. This strategic 
level analysis capability does not include element design 
and sizing capability but rather performs resource 
utilization analysis with the use of predefined lunar 
transportation and surface system element options. 
Specific performance data for lunar exploration 
architecture element options are imported into a library 
from expert-driven design/sizing tools or expert analysis. 
The SAT performs a high-level analysis that evaluates 
lunar exploration architecture scenarios through 
deterministic and probabilistic manifesting, risk analysis, 
affordability analysis, and value evaluation. [2, 3]  
Scenario analysis is completed for a planned set of 
missions in which cargo and crewed landers deliver 
elements, logistics, and humans to the lunar surface. Each 
type of lander has a capacity that is available to deliver 
elements and/or logistics. The scenario analysis 
methodology begins with the development of a 
deterministic manifest that is “closed.” Scenario closure is 
achieved when the elements, logistics, and carriers can be 
manifested within the available capacity of the 
transportation system to support the crew surface stay 
duration for each mission. [4] Deterministic analysis 
focuses on when and where the logistics and elements are 
delivered according to two initial optimization variables. 
The primary analysis metric captures each scenario’s 
planned cumulative crew surface duration. The secondary 
variable, unallocated delivery capacity, serves to 
differentiate between scenarios that share similar crew 
surface durations. Unallocated delivery capacity is lander 
capacity that is not required to support mission 
requirements and can be used during scenario 
implementation to increase productivity, reduce costs, or 
mitigate risks.  
Risk analysis evaluates the safety and uncertainty of a 
scenario. This method uses an event tree to simulate all 
possible failures. The event tree supplies information to 
determine the probability of a failure for each mission. 
Failure event consequences can range from the loss of 
crew to the loss of an element or multiple elements. The 
current risk model focuses on the vehicle reliability of the 
transportation system. A lunar surface system model will 
be included in the near future. 
After the deterministic scenario has been created, the 
scenario is analyzed probabilistically. Probabilistic 
analysis involves the use of the deterministic scenario and 
the risk analysis as a starting point for a Monte Carlo 
analysis. The probabilistic tool analyzes the scenario on a 
mission-by-mission basis and stochastically predicts 
whether that particular mission will experience a failure. 
If the mission fails, then the tool analyzes how that failed 
mission will affect the rest of the scenario and remanifests 
the remaining missions appropriately. If the mission 
succeeds, then the tool continues on to the next mission 
and continues the analysis process until all of the 
missions in the scenario have been analyzed. The 
probabilistic analysis allows a determination of the 
robustness of the scenario by accounting for the 
uncertainty and the inherent risks of human space flight. 
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Affordability analysis is also completed by starting from 
the deterministic scenario. Affordability analysis 
incorporates the life cycle cost (LCC) of various lunar 
exploration elements, integrates these element costs, and 
compares the integrated costs to projected budgets. The 
main driving parameters that affect the affordability 
analysis are scenario definition and element manipulation, 
budget scenarios, and the cost savings from participation 
of international and commercial partners. 
The data and conclusions from these various analyses are 
consolidated into high-level figures of merits (FOMs). 
These FOMs are intended to help inform the decision 
makers of the merits of various scenario options in a 
comparative form. FOMs measure the affordability, the 
extensibility and experience, the science and lunar survey, 
the sustainability, and the risk for a scenario. 
3. LUNAR EXPLORATION ARCHITECTURES 
Following the completion of ESAS, NASA has continued 
to explore the trade space for lunar exploration 
architectures, including both transportation systems and 
surface systems. Efforts have been conducted through the 
Lunar Architecture Team (LAT) and Constellation 
Architecture Team (CxAT) studies and efforts from 
various Constellation Program offices. The LAT Phase 1 
study [5] (2006) initiated a broad assessment of lunar 
architecture options that led to the selection of a South 
Pole Lunar location to support the development of a 
permanent outpost. The LAT Phase 2 study [6] (2007) 
determined the need for a diversified lunar lander system 
that provides both a dedicated crewed lander and cargo 
lander. The CxAT Lunar study identified the need for an 
enhanced Ares V/Earth Departure Stage system to 
support global access with an anytime return (2008). 
Throughout these studies, the focus of the lunar 
exploration architecture options has been on the buildup 
of an outpost at the lunar South Pole with Human Lunar 
Return (HLR) in 2019. The flight rate has been varied 
from two to four missions per year. The crew size of four 
to the lunar surface has remained constant throughout the 
studies. Primary objectives have included the 
achievement of continuous human presence on the lunar 
surface, as well as delivering science, international-
partner, commercial, and public engagement payloads to 
the lunar surface. As these studies have progressed, 
assumptions have changed which have led to the 
discovery of certain key architecture drivers. These key 
drivers, which will be discussed in Section 4, have a 
significant impact on performance, cost, risk, and value of 
the lunar exploration architecture options. 
The decision to establish an outpost with continuous 
human presence has resulted in the development of a 
lunar surface infrastructure design and logistics resupply 
methodology that meets system requirements given the 
current lunar transportation system design. The lunar 
surface infrastructure typically accounts for 30 to 40 
percent of the total delivered cargo. The remaining 60 to 
70 percent of the cargo delivered is the logistics and 
associated carriers to enable the sustained human 
presence. Logistics consists of pressurized goods (i.e., 
crew consumables and spares and maintenance), 
unpressurized spares & maintenance, gases, and liquids 
that are required to support crewed operations and 
maintain surface asset functionality. For these types of 
exploration architectures, logistics account for 
approximately 25 to 33 percent of the total mass delivered 
to the lunar surface. In addition to the logistics, cargo 
mass of the logistics carriers accounts for approximately 
25-33percent of the total delivered mass. Figure 1 shows 
a typical breakdown of the primary categories of goods 
that are required to support a human lunar outpost in 
these exploration architectures. 
 
4. KEY DRIVERS 
The analysis that has been performed over the past 
several years has demonstrated certain patterns relative to 
key factors that play a recurring significant role in 
affecting overall architecture performance, cost, and risk 
when compared with an associated return on investment. 
To date, observed architecture level key drivers include 
(1) augmentation of a crew delivery capability with a 
dedicated cargo lander system, (2) sustaining a proper 
annual mission rate, and (3) supporting the capability to 
access a wide range of lunar surface locations.  
4%
6%
27%
35%
28%
Science
Science Carriers
Elements
Logistics
Logistics Carriers
Figure 1 – Typical Distribution of Mass 
Delivered to Lunar Surface
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An analysis of the projected behavior of the complex 
interactions between the lunar transportation systems and 
the lunar surface systems has demonstrated that 
evaluation of the planned performance of the integrated 
system alone is not sufficient to adequately inform senior 
NASA management of the relative merit of different 
options. The analyst must assess the impact that the 
reliability and the uncertainty of these systems have on 
performance. Therefore, both the deterministic and the 
stochastic behavior of the architecture are represented in 
the resulting data sets.  
Finally, current study results indicate that one must 
perform sufficient sensitivity analyses for each 
architecture option to ascertain the additional return on 
investment that may be realized with a minimal additional 
amount of budget resources. This type of analysis 
approach defines the relatively large return on investment 
that can be obtained with a small number of additional 
“variable” dollars, when compared with the large “fixed” 
amount of funding that is required to achieve even a 
minimal return on investment. 
Thus, both the independent variables explicitly used in 
the analysis, as well as the interpretation of the data 
results themselves, become key drivers in terms of 
making properly informed architecture level strategic 
decisions.  
The results that are included in the following subsections 
are examples of measures of performance, cost, risk, and 
value and are not the complete set of FOMs (as 
documented in references 2 and 3). Each of these metrics 
should be considered when determining how lunar 
exploration architecture scenarios compare with one 
another. For the purpose of this paper, a subset of these 
measures has been chosen to demonstrate how scenarios 
are compared and why the following subsection topics are 
key drivers.  
The cases evaluated are all assumed to have a fixed end 
date of FY30 to allow for a quantitative comparison of 
scenarios. The performance is measured as the cumulative 
number of surface stay days that the crew can live on the 
lunar surface. The cost is measured as a normalized cost 
through FY20 and FY30. The risk is measured as a 
normalized probability of loss of crew (PLOC) over the 
total number of missions within a scenario. The cost and 
risk data are normalized as a result of the sensitive nature 
of the data. The value is measured as the percentage of 
extensibility objectives that are met and the amount of 
science mass that is delivered to the lunar surface over the 
campaign [2]. The extensibility objectives are a set of 
technology demonstration objectives that can be 
demonstrated on the Moon to support future Mars 
exploration. 
Inclusion of Cargo Lander 
LAT Phase 1 focused on the delivery of goods to the 
lunar surface with crewed lunar landers. However, as past 
programs such as Apollo have shown, human-rated 
spacecraft tend to increase in mass between conceptual 
design and the manufacturing of the vehicle. This 
behavior is compounded by the multiple components of 
an integrated transportation system. Growth in one of 
these components will affect the performance and growth 
of the other components. In addition, architecture 
scenarios where the goal is to achieve continuous human 
presence require large quantities of logistics and generally 
large elements to be delivered to the lunar surface to 
support a sustained presence. It is challenging to design a 
crewed lunar lander with the capability to deliver a large 
enough payload to support continuous human presence 
along with the capability to deliver the crew. Therefore, 
cargo landers should be considered to augment the 
crewed lunar lander. Cargo landers allow for robustness 
against crewed lander performance and element mass 
growth. 
Figure 2 presents a comparison between two sample 
scenarios, one with a cargo lander and one without a 
cargo lander. The total number of flights and the elements 
delivered to the lunar surface for each of the scenarios are 
the same; hence, the total cost through FY30 is essentially 
the same, with some slight variability due to a change in 
the number of cargo flights, which incur slightly lower 
costs than the crewed flights.  
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Figure 2 – Cargo Lander Comparison
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The cost for the cargo lander scenario is slightly higher 
through FY20 because key elements are delivered 
significantly earlier, moving the developmental costs of 
these elements earlier in the program. The cumulative 
number of surface stay days is increased by 120 percent 
because the elements and logistics to support the crew can 
be delivered earlier and in larger quantities, thus allowing 
for longer duration stays on the lunar surface through 
FY30. The percentage of extensibility objectives that are 
met is only slightly increased because of the increased 
surface stay days but remains similar because the same 
elements are delivered and the identical objectives are 
completed for each scenario; however, the objectives are 
satisfied earlier in the cargo lander scenario. The science 
mass allocation is slightly higher for the no cargo lander 
scenario, driven by the assumption for these scenarios 
that the science mass delivered is a function of the 
number of crewed missions to the lunar surface. The 
probability of loss of crew (PLOC) is slightly lower for 
the cargo lander scenario because fewer crewed missions 
exist in the scenario and additional uncrewed flights 
earlier in the scenario increases vehicle maturity. 
The inclusion of cargo landers into lunar exploration 
architecture scenarios mitigates potential reduction in the 
transportation system delivery capacity. Cargo landers 
benefit architecture scenarios regardless of crewed lander 
capacity, but the inclusion of cargo landers has a more 
pronounced effect as crewed lander capacity decreases. 
The inclusion of cargo flights within a scenario can 
provide robustness against transportation system 
uncertainty because of the extra performance capability of 
a cargo lander. Any scenario that requires the maximum 
payload capability will always lack robustness with 
respect to uncertainty in performance capability. 
Mission Rate 
The impact of varied mission rates from one to four 
missions per year, with a varied crewed and cargo lander 
ratio, has been studied and is a key driver of system 
performance. A mission consists of either a crewed 
launch (Ares I launch + Ares V launch) or a cargo launch 
(Ares V launch). Assumed mission rates drive all phases 
of a lunar exploration architecture scenario, including the 
outpost buildup phase, the outpost operational phase, and 
any planned sortie phase. Two variations of scenarios 
have been explored: those that have a constant number of 
missions per year and those with a variable number in the 
early years and a steady-state rate later in the scenario. 
For the example shown in Figure 3, a constant number of 
yearly crewed and cargo missions were explored (see 
Table 1). These cases have identical elements delivered to 
the lunar surface; no sortie missions were included for the 
purposes of this comparison. 
Table 1. Mission Rate Comparison 
Number of 
Crewed 
Missions 
Number of 
Cargo Missions 
Total Number 
of Missions 
Total Number 
of  
Launches 
1 1 2 3 
1 2 3 4 
2 1 3 5 
2 2 4 6 
3 1 4 7 
 
As seen in Figure 3, the cost through FY20 for the 
mission rate cases generally increases as the cargo lander 
flight rate increases because the surface elements can be 
delivered earlier within the scenarios, thereby placing the 
design, development, test and evaluation (DDT&E) costs 
earlier. Through FY20, cost increases when the number 
of crewed lander missions increases because of the cost of 
the additional missions. This cost increase also is 
noticeable when costs are compared through FY30, 
because the bulk of the additional cost is directly 
attributed to the increased launches per year. The 
cumulative number of surface stay days increases as 
missions are added; the largest number of surface stay 
days is achieved when two crewed and two cargo 
missions are flown per year. This big increase results 
from the balance between the logistics that are required to 
support the crew for extended durations and the delivery 
capacity of the two cargo landers. However, the decrease 
in cumulative surface stay days results for the ‘3crew 
1cargo’ case because launching one cargo mission per 
year does not provide a balance between cargo lander 
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Figure 3 – Mission Rate Comparison
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capacity and crew logistics requirements for extended 
durations.  
The percentage of extensibility objectives that are met is 
similar among all cases, except for the ‘3crew 1cargo’ 
case. This exception is mainly driven by the inability to 
achieve continued human presence as a result of the lack 
of available cargo space to send logistics to support crews 
for long-duration missions. The cumulative science mass 
increases as the number of flights increases because the 
assumption is made that each lander delivers a fixed 
amount of science. The PLOC increases as the number of 
crewed missions increases and decreases as the number of 
cargo missions increases. Again, this effect results from 
the fact that cargo missions do not affect the PLOC 
calculation but contribute to the maturity growth of the 
launch vehicle. 
Although the lower flight rate cases cost less and are less 
risky, they have less performance when compared with 
cases with a higher flight rate. As mission rates are 
varied, a balance between crewed and cargo flights must 
be maintained to achieve a high return on investment. 
Mission Location 
As stated in the publication by the National Research 
Council (NRC), “The Scientific Context for Exploration 
of the Moon” [7], maximizing the number of locations 
visited on the lunar surface would be the primary way to 
maximize scientific return. Based on this recommendation 
by the NRC, sortie missions to four alternate lunar 
locations were explored; these sortie missions replaced 
planned crewed missions to the Outpost. 
For the mission location comparison, the ‘2crew 1cargo’ 
and ‘2crew 2cargo’ cases from the mission rate section 
are used. Four sortie missions were added to each of these 
scenarios. A comparison of these scenarios is shown in 
Figure 4. The cost of cases with sortie missions is slightly 
less than the cost of scenarios without sortie missions. 
This cost reduction is mainly attributable to the reduction 
of logistics required to support the crew while at the 
Outpost. The number of cumulative surface stay days 
decreases for scenarios with sortie missions because the 
number of missions through FY30 remains the same, but 
the Outpost missions that have been eliminated have 
longer durations than the assumed seven-day sortie 
missions. The percentage of extensibility objectives met 
is also reduced for scenarios with sortie missions because 
Outpost missions are replaced with sortie missions and 
the extensibility objectives are Outpost focused. The 
science mass that is delivered is identical given that the 
science mass is a function of mission rate, not location. If 
science mass to the Outpost was a metric, then cases with 
sortie missions would obviously result in a lower 
cumulative mass; however, given the NRC 
recommendation, scientific return is maximized by 
visiting multiple locations. The PLOC is also identical 
because this value is currently based on the mission rate 
and the number of crewed missions. 
Planned Versus Expected 
Strategic analysis is typically done in a deterministic 
manner in which scenario performance is optimized over 
a set of missions that proceed exactly as planned. 
However, given the large risks that are involved with 
human space flight and the high level of uncertainty in 
technology, budget, vehicle reliability, and schedules, it is 
important to characterize the possible range of behavior 
of the system by performing probabilistic analysis. [8] 
For this analysis, probabilistic results were produced 
based solely on the reliability of the transportation 
system. These transportation system reliabilities are 
derived from preliminary risk analysis study results 
provided by the individual Constellation transportation 
projects (i.e., Orion, Ares I, Ares V, and Altair) for 
incorporation into an integrated risk model developed by 
the SAT. These individual transportation project 
reliabilities are then further parsed by mission phase to 
allow for proper accounting of mission specific failure 
consequences. These differences between deterministic 
and probabilistic results would likely become greater if 
lunar surface system reliabilities and/or uncertainty in 
technology development schedule are also taken into 
account.  
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Within this analysis, probabilistic results are expressed as 
the mean value produced though Monte Carlo analysis. 
These values represent an average of expected outcomes 
that account for real-world uncertainties driven by 
transportation system failure rates for lunar missions. This 
characterization of the difference between the planned 
and expected outcomes is a key driver as one must 
overplan from the beginning in order to achieve the 
planned end state. Typically, the expected end state will 
yield a lower return on investment than the initially 
planned value. If the planned return on investment is 
required, then analysis indicates that either additional 
resources in the form of increased flight rate and/or 
schedule will be required to meet original objectives. For 
the ‘2crew 2cargo’ case presented above, the 
deterministic and probabilistic results are presented in 
Figure 5. 
As quantified in this figure, the cumulative surface stay 
days, science mass, and number of crewed missions are 
all decreased for the probabilistic results, as compared 
with the planned values. The probabilistic values are all 
limited because the scenarios end in FY30. If the 
probabilistic scenario was allowed to progress past FY30, 
continuing until the original planned missions were 
completed, the metrics would be the same as the 
deterministic results. The percentage of extensibility 
objectives met is approximately the same because most of 
the objectives are met within a given number of flights, 
which are completed in both scenarios. This type of 
uncertainty information is extremely important to 
understand early in the design process so that limited 
program resources can be spent to tackle the more 
important problems. 
Return on Investment – Fixed Versus Variable Cost 
For assessment of return on investment, the mission rate 
cases (see Table 1) were used. Independent of which 
scenario is chosen, a certain “fixed” amount of 
investment in lunar transportation systems and lunar 
surface systems is required to enable even the simplest 
option (i.e., ‘1crew 1cargo’). Additionally, the analysis 
results indicate that a much larger return on investment 
can be achieved when a relatively small amount of 
additional “variable” funds are used to increase the 
annual mission rate. This return on investment is 
measured in cumulative surface stay days and is 
illustrated in Figure 6(a). 
However, one must also take into account other measures 
to determine the best overall return on investment. For 
example, Figure 6(b) shows the cumulative surface stay 
days versus the normalized PLOC for the cases. The 
‘2crew 2cargo’ case, as shown in Figure 6(b), does have 
an increase in PLOC over the ‘1crew 1cargo’ case but 
allows for a significant number of surface days compared 
with the other cases. The two graphs in Figure 6 illustrate 
how combining multiple metrics can aid decision makers 
in making more informed decisions. 
5. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity analysis facilitates the understanding of 
parameters and their impact on performance, cost, risk, 
and value. As the goals and assumptions of the lunar 
exploration architectures are modified, sensitivity analysis 
is performed to determine the robustness of these 
architectures. The results presented in this section may or 
may not translate to future architectures as the ground 
rules and assumptions are updated. Sensitivities that result 
in the same trends regardless of assumptions and ground 
rules typically lead to the discovery of key drivers.  
Sensitivity analysis is typically applied to deterministic 
scenarios to understand the implications of given 
assumptions at a higher level of analysis. The primary 
method to achieve closure in the sensitivity analyses is to 
increase or decrease crew surface days. The specific 
elements for all of the sensitivity analyses were not 
resized to optimize the scenario. In general, the delivery 
order of the elements was also maintained. However, in 
some cases elements had to be reordered to allow 
sufficient logistics to be delivered to support the crew. To 
fully take advantage of (or mitigate) a change in 
Deterministic Probabilistic
Figure 5 – Comparison of Deterministic and Probabilistic Scenario Analysis
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performance, the scenario should be fully restructured, 
with the elements being resized to optimize the overall 
performance of the scenario. 
The primary initial optimization variable that was used to 
compare sensitivity cases was planned cumulative surface 
stay days. The secondary variable was unallocated lunar 
lander capacity over the entire scenario. Often, scenarios 
are distinctly different but have similar planned 
cumulative surface stay days. This secondary variable 
was used to differentiate between those scenarios. The 
unallocated lander mass cannot be used to increase 
cumulative surface stay days because of the inherent 
constraints on the scenario. The sensitivities discussed 
below include lander cargo capacity, pressurized volume, 
technology options, spares and maintenance, element 
mass, and logistics carrier capacities. 
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Cargo Capacity 
The lander capacity sensitivity explores how various 
lander capacities affect the ability to deliver crew and 
cargo to the lunar surface. For both the crewed and cargo 
landers, an ideal available mass exists that will efficiently 
carry all elements and required logistics and spares for the 
missions. The cargo lander capacity was incrementally 
changed by 0.5 metric tons (t), positively and negatively. 
The crewed lander capacity remained at 1 t for outpost 
missions and 0.55 t for sortie missions. The crewed lander 
capacities were not varied because the sensitivity analysis 
is exploring the performance of the lander, not the design 
of the lander. It is assumed that the design of the lander 
would change to retain the crewed lander capability at the 
expense of the cargo lander performance.  
Figure 7 quantifies the results of the sensitivity analysis. 
From the baseline case, decreasing the lander capacity 
dramatically reduces crew surface duration and available 
unallocated lander capacity. Increasing the lander 
capacity minimally beneficially affects crew surface 
duration, yet the available unallocated lander capacity 
increases significantly. 
The cargo lander capacity drives early missions (i.e., 
missions thru 2024). As denoted in the white boxes in 
Figure 7, the lower mass that is available to the missions 
early on results in Outpost elements being pushed back to 
later missions and the period of Outpost buildup being 
extended. The higher lander capacity, as previously 
stated, carries sufficient unallocated mass capacity to 
afford a mission of opportunity. A mission of opportunity 
results from sufficient unallocated lander capacity 
existing such that a cargo mission could be replaced by a 
crewed mission without impacting the scenario’s 
cumulative crewed surface duration. Missions of 
opportunity can be used to deliver additional 
infrastructure, add a sortie mission to an alternate lunar 
location, and reduce the flight rate to the Moon in 
preparation to transition to Mars. 
Pressurized Delivery Volume 
Pressurized carriers, with volume and mass capability 
constraints, are required to carry the pressurized logistics 
that are necessary for surface operations. Because the 
available pressurized volume and mass can vary with 
assumed sizing of these pressurized carriers, the sizing 
affects the amount of pressurized crew consumables that 
can be carried. Restricting the crew logistics delivery 
capability constrains the crew surface duration. 
The volume and mass of the pressurized carriers are 
dependent on lander capacity. Often when insufficient 
mass capacity is available on the lander, plenty of 
pressurized volume is available, or vice versa. Because 
both quantities are constraints to having a scenario 
“close”, balancing the two quantities is a necessity. The 
trade-off between lander capacity and pressurized mass 
stems from elements able to carry pressurized logistics 
within it. Elements with pressurized capability, such as a 
habitat or a dedicated pressurized logistics carrier, require 
other elements to function—power, communications, 
mobility, and so on. These additional elements use the 
lander mass capacity, which leaves little room for any 
additional mass. These are typically early missions in the 
scenario when the focus of the scenario is outpost 
buildup; thus, the early cumulative mission days are kept 
short. The other aspect is generally represented in 
missions later in the scenario. Here, crew surface time is 
limited by the pressurized consumables that are available. 
After the Outpost elements are delivered, cargo missions 
become resupply missions for restocking the spares and 
logistics. Without the large 
mass elements, excess lander 
capacity is available. The 
pressurized volume and mass 
is restricted to the size of a 
pressurized logistics module 
(PLM); because of lander 
volume constraints, typically 
only one PLM is delivered per 
cargo mission. 
Figure 8 shows examples of 
scenarios that are limited in 
lander capacity and pressurized 
mass/volume. The graphs in 
Figure 8 (a) and (c) show the 
pressurized volume utilization. 
The green bars indicate how 
much of the available volume 
is used, and the yellow bars 
indicate how much is not used. 
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The graphs in Figure 8 (b) and (d) show the capacity that 
is used for elements (light blue), for logistics and carriers 
(dark blue), and the unused mass (yellow). The top two 
graphs show a scenario that is limited in lander capacity. 
The bottom two graphs show a scenario that is 
pressurized volume limited. 
The sensitivity analysis completed for pressurized carriers 
varied the volumetric size, affecting the mass-carrying 
capacity of a PLM. The sensitivity analysis was executed 
by varying the diameter and the length of a PLM. These 
dimensional changes increase or decrease the pressurized 
capacity and allow for more or fewer pressurized logistics 
delivered to the lunar surface. Larger useable pressurized 
(c) (d)
Figure 8 – Example Cases of: (a) & (b) Total Capacity Limited Scenario
(c) & (d) Pressurized Volume Limited Scenario
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capacities allow for extending crew surface stay duration, 
whereas smaller useable pressurized capacities will 
reduce surface stay duration unless multiple pressurized 
carriers can be delivered on a cargo lander. 
Figure 9 shows the results of varying the dimensions of a 
PLM. The graph illustrates that an increase in diameter 
results in an increase in crew surface stay duration; 
however, the increase in diameter from 3.5 m to 3.75 m 
does not significantly increase the surface duration. In 
addition, an increase in length typically decreases the 
available lander capacity. 
Technology Options 
Application of advanced technologies can allow for mass 
savings over the duration of a scenario. However, 
technology does come at a cost, usually in dollars and 
schedule. The technology options that were considered in 
this sensitivity include Environmental Control and Life 
Support System (ECLSS), In-Situ Resource Utilization 
(ISRU), lander water scavenging, and Extra Vehicular 
Activity (EVA) water recovery. Each phase of the 
scenario has a different set of requirements on how each 
of these technology options is used.  
ECLSS involves water recovery, carbon dioxide (CO2) 
reduction, brine recovery, drying of solids, and laundry 
usage. For water recovery, all cases assume that 93.5 
percent of the water is recovered. For CO2 reduction, a 
Sabatier reactor is used, which is a methane reduction 
method. For brine recovery, the percentages are varied at 
99 percent, 50 percent, and 0 percent. With solids drying, 
recovery options are 0 percent and 50 percent. Laundry 
usage is either on or off, to differentiate between whether 
the crew washes their clothes or brings all of the clothes 
that are needed for the duration of the mission. The 
ECLSS is delivered as part of the main habitat element 
and does not start functioning until the habitat element is 
delivered on the lunar surface. The laundry machines are 
also delivered in the main habitat element, but laundry 
usage does not begin until a crewed mission surface stay 
duration exceeds 21 days, a breakpoint at which the water 
required for laundry is less than the clothes mass with no 
laundry usage. The oxygen production ISRU plant 
capability was varied between 0 kg, 500 kg, and 1000 kg 
per year. Lander water scavenging assumes usage of the 
leftover fuel from the lander, and water is generated from 
it to produce either 200 kg or 400 kg of water per lander 
delivered to the lunar surface. EVA water recovery 
involves recovering water back from the EVA suit. These 
case combinations are shown in Figure 10 and are defined 
as: 
• ECLSS 1: 0 percent water recovery, 0 percent brine, 
0 percent solids, no O2 generation, no CO2 recovery, 
no EVA CO2 recovery 
• ECLSS 4: 93.5 percent water recovery, 0 percent 
brine, 0 percent solids, O2 generation, no CO2 
recovery, no EVA CO2 recovery 
• ECLSS 15: 93.5 percent water recovery, 99 percent 
brine, 0 percent solids, O2 generation, CO2 recovery 
(CH4), no EVA CO2 recovery. 
Trends show that water scavenging can boost the length 
of crew surface stay duration by a considerable number of 
days and also can free up lander capacity. The analysis 
also shows that water scavenging limits the impact of an 
ISRU plant (500 kg per year) to a slightly increased crew 
surface stay duration and that a second ISRU plant (1000 
kg total per year) has no effect on the crew surface stay 
duration. As the ECLSS becomes more “closed” by the 
assumed technologies and with water scavenging 
available, ISRU has a minimal impact on the unallocated 
lander capacity as well. An ECLSS technology 
investment greatly increases the crew surface stay 
duration compared with a completely open ECLSS. 
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Higher levels of water recovery start to increase 
unallocated lander capacity but do not increase crew 
surface duration. 
The technologies assumed for this sensitivity analysis 
start to lead to diminishing returns and therefore the 
unallocated lander capacity increases because the need to 
bring water on the flights is no longer required to support 
the crew. Unfortunately, these technologies do not 
increase early mission crew surface stay duration. These 
missions do not have the mass or pressurized mass 
available to increase the days because other crew 
logistics, such as food and other consumables not directly 
related to water, are required. 
Spares and Maintenance 
The lunar architecture elements require repairs and 
replacements in order to run efficiently throughout the 
lifetime of the scenario. The assumption is that for each 
year a specified amount of spares and maintenance 
equipment must be delivered to the 
Outpost to support the elements. The 
sensitivity for spares and maintenance is 
varied from the original spares and 
maintenance mass assumptions by 
increments and decrements of 10 percent, 
25 percent, and 50 percent. The masses 
of the element were not varied for this 
sensitivity.  
Figure 11 shows a slight increase in crew 
surface stay duration and a significant 
increase in available lander capacity 
when the required spares and 
maintenance mass is reduced. Small 
increases in the required mass leads to a 
marginal decrease in crew surface stay 
duration and a significant reduction in 
available unallocated lander capacity, 
whereas large increases affect the crew 
surface stay duration considerably. 
Element Mass 
Closure for a flight depends mainly on 
lander mass and pressurized mass 
capability. Generally, because the focus 
of the scenarios is an early outpost 
buildup, the surface days earlier in the 
scenario are more likely to be affected by 
element mass. The more massive 
elements reduce the available mass for 
other elements/logistics that may be 
necessary to support human presence. 
Mass growth can cause the Outpost 
buildup phase to be extended and can 
delay the point at which sufficient 
functionality exists on the lunar surface 
to support crew operations. 
The sensitivity analysis presented focuses on changes to 
the most massive elements: the habitat and the PLMs. The 
original element masses were varied both positively and 
negatively by 5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent. 
Performing this sensitivity analysis shows the impact that 
a major change to the mass of these elements will have on 
the entire scenario. 
Variations in the habitat and the PLM mass from the 
baseline have a minimal impact on surface stay duration 
until the mass starts to increase significantly; at this point, 
the duration of the crew surface stay is reduced as seen in 
Figure 12. A slight impact is also noted on the available 
unallocated lander capacity.  
Logistics Carrier Capacities 
Logistics carriers are used to deliver pressurized, 
unpressurized, gas, and liquid logistics, with the mass of 
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the carriers typically accounting for 25 to 33 percent of 
the total delivered mass in the current scenarios. Varying 
the capacity of the carriers in 10 percent decrements and 
increments provides an assessment of the robustness of 
the baseline scenario to small changes in carrier capacity. 
Only slight increases in crew surface duration and 
unallocated lander capacity are realized when the carrier 
capacity increases, as seen in Figure 13. Decreasing the 
capacity leads to a loss in crew surface stay duration and 
unallocated mass. The logistics carrier capacities drive the 
scenario primarily because of the change in available 
pressurized capacity. 
6. SUMMARY 
As NASA prepares to return to the Moon, lunar 
exploration architecture scenarios are being formulated to 
determine the best approach to satisfying the goal of 
continuous human presence on the lunar surface. 
Although a final detailed approach will not be decided for 
many years, strategic analysis can be utilized to aid 
decision makers in the comparison of approaches. The 
current lunar exploration architectures are focused on 
facilitating the early buildup of an Outpost, transporting a 
crew of four to the lunar surface, and maintaining 
continuous human presence. Given these objectives, 
strategic analysis has determined a handful of key drivers 
that significantly impact the performance, cost, risk, and 
value of the scenarios. 
The five key drivers that significantly impact the 
architecture scenarios consist of inclusion of a cargo 
lander, mission rate, mission location, fixed-versus-
variable cost/return on investment, and probabilistic 
manifesting. The inclusion of a cargo lander protects 
against the dependence of the success of a lunar 
exploration architecture on the crewed lander capacity to 
not decrease. The cargo lander increases 
the robustness of a scenario by allowing 
for the delivery of elements whose mass 
is greater than the crewed lander cargo 
capacity, facilitating the buildup of an 
Outpost, and delivering logistics in large 
quantities to support the goal of continued 
human presence. Although changes in 
mission rate drive the costs of the 
scenarios, the optimum ratio of crewed to 
cargo missions allows for meeting the 
aforementioned objectives while 
balancing the number of crew delivered to 
the lunar surface and the logistics and 
elements required to support the crew 
while on the surface. As determined by 
the NRC, science objectives are better 
met by visiting a variety of locations on 
the lunar surface. If achieving science 
objectives is highly important, then 
opportunities exist to trade Outpost crewed missions for 
sortie missions. For any of the architectures to be 
achieved, a “fixed” cost exists for even the minimum 
number of missions. As more crewed and cargo flights 
are added, this variable cost will increase the value of the 
scenarios; however, the risk will also be increased. In 
addition, in analyzing architecture scenarios, one must 
look at both planned, or deterministic, and expected, or 
probabilistic, results. The probabilistic analysis accounts 
for the uncertainty and risks that exist with human space 
flight. 
Sensitivity analysis is also important for understanding 
how variables affect the scenarios and for determining 
whether these variables are key drivers. Sensitivity 
analysis, generally studied by the strategic analysis team, 
includes variability to mass, pressurized volume, lander 
capacity, and technology options. Many other variables 
can be studied to determine their importance to 
influencing the architecture scenarios. The SAT looks at 
cumulative surface stay days and unallocated lander 
capacity as the primary and secondary metrics for 
comparing scenarios in the performance of sensitivity 
analysis. 
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